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The notion of security has been subject to serious rethinking by in-
ternational relations scholars and foreign policy advisors since at least
the 1980s, but increasingly since the end of the Cold War.' This is be-
cause the realist paradigms of territorial sovereignty, national interest,
and military force that dominated Cold War discourse are no longer con-
sidered as well suited to the transnational character of many of the new
challenges of the post-Cold War era. In fact, it has been claimed that the
impetus to this radical reappraisal of security discourse was "the very
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novelty of peace" between the Communist bloc and the West at the end
of the Cold War.2 Arguably, the most important attempt to reconceptual-
ize security has been the introduction of the concept of "human
security."
Emerging from within development circles, rather than security cir-
cles, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) stated in its
1994 annual report that the concept of security has been too narrowly
construed for too long "as security of territory from external aggression,
or as protection of national interest in foreign policy, or as global secu-
rity from the threat of a nuclear holocaust."3 Arguing that it is time to
move beyond the narrow concept of "national security" or "territorial
integrity" to "an all-encompassing [trans-boundary] concept of human
security,, 4 the UNDP identified two main components of this new ap-
proach:
It means, first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, dis-
ease and repression. And second, it means protection from
sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life.'
The UNDP predicted that the "idea of human security.., is likely to
revolutionize society in the 21st century.' 6 This prediction has not been
born out, however, not least due to the post September 11 reassertion of
conventional national security agendas. Nonetheless, the new human
security paradigm is growing in influence. At a minimum, it is an impor-
tant conceptual shift and complementary policy objective on the
international agenda.
Accordingly, a U.N. Commission on Human Security (CHS) was es-
tablished in 2000, cochaired by Amartya Sen and Sadako Ogata. In
2003, the CHS issued its final report, in which it concluded that human
security means protecting "vital freedoms." It means protecting people
from critical and pervasive threats and situations, building on their
strengths and aspirations. It also means creating systems that give people
the building blocks of survival, dignity, and livelihood. Human security
connects different types of freedoms-freedom from want, freedom
from fear, and freedom to take action on one's own behalf. To achieve
2. Id. at2.
3. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME [UNDP], HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 22 (1994).
4. Id. at 24.
5. Id. at 23.
6. Id. at 22.
[Vol. 30:763
Human Security and the Rights of Refugees
human security, it offers two general strategies: protection and empow-
erment.7
The human security paradigm focuses directly and specifically on
people and their right to live in safety and dignity and to earn a liveli-
hood, rather than on the State and its security and sovereignty. Human
security treats security, rights, and development as mutually reinforcing
goals and is oriented as much toward the protection of individuals as
toward their empowerment. It also reinforces the view that no matter
how vigorously a State defends its national borders, today's global
threats, such as environmental degradation, international terrorism, pov-
erty, and infectious diseases do not respect them. It also challenges us to
revisit notions of territory and sovereignty as far as they inhibit global
action in the face of transnational threats to our shared security and hu-
manity.8 However, the idea of human security has met considerable
criticism.
One of the main concerns of the human security framework is that it
may undermine hard-won human rights guarantees or otherwise displace
law-based systems of protection. This concern has raised many questions
about the discourse on human security. Is it intended to or likely to re-
place or undermine human rights? Does it threaten these hard-won legal
gains? These questions are addressed in this Essay. A second level of
inquiry in this Essay interrogates what the "human security/human
rights" dialogue means for the protection of refugees, who have typically
been outside the remit of States' national interests, except insofar as they
are seen as threats to a State's security or some geopolitical pawns in the
realist security paradigms of the Cold War and its bipolar politics. As
non-citizens who are on the perimeters of the citizen-state protection
system, refugees have been reliant largely on specific legal regimes, sup-
ported by humanitarian goodwill, for their protection. However, these
legal regimes have been increasingly eroded by state noncompliance and
exploitation of legal loopholes. This Essay asks whether the framework
of human security may offer a complementary source of protection in the
face of eroding refugee rights.
In the background to these debates lie disciplinary boundaries be-
tween scholars of international relations and international law
respectively. These boundaries can, to an extent, determine whether the
human security framework is accepted or rejected. Any attempt at evalu-
7. COMM'N ON HUMAN SECURITY [CHS], HUMAN SECURITY Now iv-v (2003), avail-
able at http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/English/FinalReport.pdf (last visited
May 27, 2009).
8. For more on the changing nature of territoriality and sovereignty, see Saskia Sassen,
Bordering Capabilities Versus Borders: inplications for National Borders, 30 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 567 (2009).
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ating the usefulness of the human security framework must therefore be
cognizant of the disciplinary tradition from which one starts.
Security and human rights have been concurrent aims of the United
Nations since its inception in 1945.9 Under the traditional realist view of
international relations, despite the proliferation of international human
rights instruments, international legal obligations have been regarded at
best as "a significant brake on the pursuit of [national] interests"'" and
have been pursued as far as they satisfy or further state interests." Lassa
Oppenheim, for example, invokes the idea of state interests to explain
the construction of the rules of international law.'2 In contrast, many in-
ternational lawyers do not generally examine why States follow or
violate human rights obligations. Rather, they seek instead to articulate
ways to strengthen or to improve the law. 3
These same divisions are also being played out in the context of the
human security framework. International relations theorists have either
rejected the framework because it downplays State interests to individual
needs (the realist and neo-realist schools of thought"), or have found it
appealing as a new method of conceptualizing international relations and
security discourse because of its broader view of reality (for example,
liberalism, constructivism, or critical security studies 7). Meanwhile,
some international lawyers are skeptical of it either because of its lack of
9. U.N. Charter arts. 1(1)-1(3), 2(3), 2(4), 2(6), 13, 55(c), 62(2), 68, 76(c), chs. VI-
VII.
10. JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 15
(2005).
II. Id.
12. See 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE (2d ed. 1912).
13. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 10, at 15; see also DAVID ARMSTRONG ET
AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (2007).
14. KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979). For an over-
view of traditional security discourse, see ARNOLD WOLFERS, DISCORD AND COLLABORATION:
ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1962); see also Alice Edwards & Carla Ferstman, Hu-
manising Non-Citizens: The Convergence of Human Rights and Human Security, in HUMAN
SECURITY AND NoN-CITIZENS, supra note *, ch. 1.
15. For a discussion on liberalism, see generally ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEM-
ONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (2005); BRUCE
RUSSETT & JOHN R. ONEAL, TRIANGULATING PEACE: DEMOCRACY, INTERDEPENDENCE, AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (2001).
16. For discussions on constructivism, see generally ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THE-
ORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1999); Ted Hopf, The Promise of Constructivism in JR
Theory, 23 INT'L SEC. 171 (1997); Edward Newman, Human Security and Constructivism, 2
INT'L STUD. PERSP. 239 (2001).
17. Critical Security Studies provide the theoretical underpinning to the human security
approach. See generally MCSWEENEY, supra note 1; NEW THINKING ABOUT STRATEGY AND
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (Ken Booth ed., 1991).
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enforceability, its alleged conceptual "fuzziness," or the fact that it may
threaten or undermine binding human rights norms. 8
As an international lawyer, I have much sympathy for the concerns
raised by international lawyers about the non-legal nature of the human
security framework and all that this entails. However, I am also cogni-
zant of the fact that, as lawyers, we sometimes overstate the effect of the
legal system on state behavior, agenda setting, and the protection and
empowerment of individuals (particularly refugees and other non-
citizens). I posit that, notwithstanding our present attachment to discipli-
nary boundaries, international law cannot and should not be divorced
from international relations.
At best, States acknowledge the importance of an effective interna-
tional legal system,' 9 as the law regulates many areas of international
life. In particular, it "provides for stability in international relations. '20
However, international human rights and refugee laws contain only a
minimum set of standards. These standards are selectively and poorly
enforced, usually relying on their coinciding with the political objectives
of States to achieve their aims. This is not to suggest in any way that per-
suasive arguments cannot be made to States that they must observe their
internationally agreed obligations under international law. However, at-
tributing such compliance to non-instrumentalist reasons" is only one
theory of why States respect international law. A second school of
thought holds that States comply for instrumentalist reasons, such as for
fear of retaliation for noncompliance, for reasons of future cooperation,
for national interests, or for reasons of reputation. This latter theory
explains why recourse to rights-based language has been met with, in
• 21
some cases, limited success or even resistance. It is at this juncture be-
tween rights and security that human security-as a transboundary and
cross-disciplinary concept--can potentially step in to bolster, strengthen,
and support the law. For States, it may permit the reconciliation of in-
strumentalist and non-instrumentalist goals. At the same time, however,
it may be applied to further political objectives rather than as a set of
18. See infra Part III.A.
19. Arthur Watts, The Importance of International Law, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN IN-
TERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 5,
7 (Michael Byers ed., 2000).
20. Id.
21. An example of such a non-instrumentalist reason is that a State may comply be-
cause it is the right thing to do, or because its citizens believe it is the right thing to do.
22. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 10, at 100-04 (discussing theories of state
compliance with international law).
23. See, for example, the U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Geno-
cide, whose obligations to act failed to stop the genocide in Rwanda or in the former
Yugoslavia in the 1990s. G.A. Res. 96 (I), art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1/96 (Nov. 11, 1946).
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guiding principles and must be carefully monitored to ensure that States
do not appropriate it entirely for their own ends.
I examine the concept of human security through the lens of refugee
protection. In particular, I ask whether the concept of human security
could add anything to the international protection regime for refugees
and asylum seekers under international law. Before international lawyers
can reject the notion of human security on the basis of its non-legal, and
therefore nonbinding, character, it is necessary to examine the gaps in
the existing legal framework, into which policy discourse, including se-
curity discourse, may step in as an important player.
I start by providing a summary of the origins and development of the
human security framework, how it has been defined, and what have been
identified as its main shortcomings. I then provide an overview of how
refugees and asylum seekers have been featured in this security dis-
course. I follow this overview with an analysis of the legal protection
regime relating to refugees, including recourse to human rights standards
to fill some of the legal gaps in that regime. Finally, I ask whether the
human security framework is in any way beneficial to refugees.
I. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN SECURITY
As noted above, Cold War security discourse was dominated by
State borders, national interests, and the arms race. This traditional view
of security explains the underlying principles of the U.N. Charter of
1945, namely the sovereign equality of States, mutual coexistence, the
maintenance of international peace and security through collective ac-
tion, and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States 4
However, this realist political agenda has failed to solve the majority
of the world's security concerns, including many non-military threats,
such as those arising from globalization, poverty, and environmental is-
sues." This agenda also ignores the fact that human rights, including
economic and social rights, non-discrimination, and international coop-
eration are also central features of the U.N. Charter. 6
In the post-Cold War context, non-military threats have been increas-
ingly recognized as being of equal seriousness as military threats; at a
24. See U.N. Charter arts. 1-2 (discussing sovereign equality, international cooperation,
harmonization, and maintenance of international peace and security); see also id. chs. VI-VII
(discussing prohibition on use of force, subject to individual or collective self defense or Secu-
rity Council action).
25. See Barry Buzan, Rethinking Security After the Cold War, 32 COOPERATION &
CONFLICr 5, 5-10 (1997).
26. U.N. Charter arts. 1(3), 13, 55 (discussing human rights); id. arts. 1(I), chs. VI, VII
(discussing collective measures and cooperation).
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minimum, they have gained some international attention. This shift in
security discourse mainly "proceeds from the assumption that defining
national security merely (or even primarily) in military terms conveys a
profoundly false image of reality. '27 This false image gives rise to two
problems:
First, it causes [S]tates to concentrate on military threats and to
ignore other and perhaps even more harmful dangers. Thus it re-
duces their total security. And second, it contributes to a
pervasive militarization of international relations that in the long
run can only increase global insecurity.
2
It further "presupposes that threats arising from outside a [S]tate are
somehow more dangerous to its security than threats that arise within
it,' 29 and overlooks the fact that state protection is often pursued at the
expense of individuals' personal security. ° A call was thus made to con-
ceive of many of these non-military issues as security concerns3 in order
to put them on the international agenda.
The 1994 UNDP report was lauded as groundbreaking and innova-
tive, although, as has been noted by some academics, the ideas behind
- 32
human security had been around for some time. It has been further ob-
27. See, e.g., Richard H. Ullman, Redefining Security, 8 INT'L SEC. 129, 129 (1983).
28. Id. at 129.
29. Id. at 133.
30. See BARRY BUZAN, PEOPLE, STATES AND FEAR: AN AGENDA FOR INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY STUDIES IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 22, 37-38 (2d ed. 1991); BARBARA VON
TIGERSTROM, HUMAN SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS 12
(2007) (citing MICHAEL SHEEHAN, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: AN ANALYTICAL SURVEY II
n.7 (2005)).
31. Ullman, supra note 27, at 129. See generally Jessica Tuchman Mathews, Redefining
Security, 68 FOREIGN AW. 162 (1989); The Environment and International Security, in
WORLD SECURITY: CHALLENGES FOR A NEW CENTURY (Jessica Tuchman Mathews et al. eds.,
2d ed. 1994).
32. Already, in 1980, reports of the Brandt Commission stressed that:
security must be reconceived with people foremost in mind. The purely defensive
concept of security should be enlarged to include hunger, disease, poverty, envi-
ronmental stress, repression, and terrorism, all of which endanger human security
as much as any military provocation. To that end, the international community has
the responsibility to eliminate any social conditions that pose threats to the protec-
tion and dignity of people, before they erupt into armed conflict.
JAMES BERNARD QUILLIGAN, THE BRANDT EQUATION: 21ST CENTURY BLUEPRINT FOR THE
NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY 13 (2002). In 1987, the Brundtland Commission report noted that a
"comprehensive approach to international and national security must transcend the traditional
emphasis on military power and armed competition. The real sources of insecurity also en-
compass unsustainable development, and its effects can become intertwined with traditional
forms of conflict in a manner that can extend and deepen the latter." World Comm'n on Envi-
ronment & Development, Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development:
Our Common Future, 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/42/187/Annex (Aug. 2, 1987). For antecedents in
Spring 20091
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served that transnational threats could not properly be dealt with unilat-
erally, but required collective action and international cooperation and
multilateralism. 33 In this new security environment, a one-dimensional
focus on the nation-state is less relevant. Military threats that did exist
have largely shifted from being international to internal in character. For
example, individuals in the post-Cold War era face a greater risk of hu-
man rights violations at the hands of their own governments than of
34external aggression. Realist approaches have also failed to respond
adequately to such issues as international terrorism.35
In 1992, the U.N. Security Council formally recognized that "non-
military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and
ecological fields have become threats to peace and security. ''36 Super-
power rivalry and bipolar politics had ended, and the world was entering
a period of globalization and increased cross-border flows of capital,
goods, and people.37 Within this context, national borders were increas-
ingly seen as less important, although they remained and were
strengthened in relation to preventing, among other things, irregular mi-
gration. This has included efforts to deter the movement of asylum-
seekers and refugees from the global South to the global North.
Since the release of the UNDP report, the human security concept
has featured variously within the U.N. system.38 In 1999, a Trust Fund
international relations theory, see Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, Human Security in International
Relations: Blessing or Scourge, 4 HUM. SEC. J., 9 (2007). Tdjbakhsh stated:
[The] idea [of human security] had been part of academic debates since the early
[1980s], where expanding and deepening security studies revolved around Barry
Buzan and others' Copenhagen School scholars in international relations theories. If
Buzan's movement emphasized on the social aspects of security, the constructivist,
critical and feminist theories in international relations had further brought the unit
of analysis, and the referent object and subject of "security" down to the level of in-
dividuals.
Id.
33. CHS, supra note 7. nassim
34. See GIL LOESCHER, THE UNHCR AND WORLD POLITICS: A PERILOUS PATH (2006).
35. See generally National Security and the "War on Terror", in HUMAN SECURITY
AND NoN-CITIZENS, supra note *, at pt. IV.
36. U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3046th mtg. at 142, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3046 (Jan. 31, 1992).
37. SHAHRBANOU TADJBAKHSH & ANURADHA M. CHENOY, HUMAN SECURITY: CON-
CEPTS AND IMPLICATIONS 1 (2007).
38. See, e.g., The Secretary-General, We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in
the Twenty-First Century: Millennium Report of the Secretary-General, delivered to the Gen-
eral Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/54/2000 (Mar. 27, 2000); World Summit for Social Development,
Copenhagen, Den., Mar. 6-12, 1995, Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development and
Programme of Action for the World Summit for Social Development, R 2, 5, 8, 20, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.166/9 (Apr. 19, 1995); THE COMM'N ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, OUR GLOBAL
NEIGHBORHOOD (1995); see also VON TIGERSTROM, supra note 30; G8 Foreign Ministers'
Meeting, Cologne, 10 June 1999, Conclusions, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/g8fmm-
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for Human Security was established that finances projects carried out by
organizations in the U.N. system, and when appropriate, in partnership
with non-U.N. entities, to advance the operational impact of the human
security concept.39 This Trust Fund is managed by the Human Security
Unit, a body that works to integrate human security into all U.N. activi-
ties and now operates as a formal structure within the U.N. system. 0 In
1999, the Human Security Network, a high-level group of likeminded
countries, was established to maintain dialogue on human security is-
sues.4' Human security was also prominently highlighted in the U.N.
Secretary General's Millennium Report, in which former Secretary Gen-
eral Kofi Annan noted that:
In the wake of these [internal rather than international] conflicts,
a new understanding of the concept of security is evolving. Once
synonymous with the defense of territory from external attack,
the requirements of security today have come to embrace the
protection of communities and individuals from internal vio-
lence.
The need for a more human-centered approach to security is re-
inforced by the continuing dangers that weapons of mass
destruction, most notably nuclear weapons, pose to humanity:
their very name reveals their scope and their intended objective,
if they were ever used. 2
At the 2005 World Summit, the human security concept was recog-
nized and the Peacebuilding Commission established:
We stress the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free
from poverty and despair. We recognize that all individuals, in
particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear
and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all
their rights and fully develop their human potential. To this end,
g8rmae/concl-en.asp (last visited June 18, 2009) (discussing human security in the conclu-
sions).
39. An initial contribution of 500 million yen was donated by the Government of Japan
to set up the Trust Fund. For further information on the Trust Fund, see United Nations Trust
Fund for Human Security, http://ochaonline.un.org/TrustFund/tabid/2107/Default.aspx (last
visited June 18, 2009),
40. See U.N. Trust Fund for Human Security, Human Security Unit (2007),
http://ochaonline.un.org/HumanSecurityUnit/tabid/2212/language/en-US/Default.aspx (last
visited June 18, 2009).
41. See The Human Security Network, www.humansecuritynetwork.org/network-e.php
(last visited June 18, 2009).
42. The Secretary-General, supra note 38, IT 194-95.
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we commit ourselves to discussing and defining the notion of
human security in the General Assembly. 3
Following up on this commitment, the U.N. General Assembly held
its first thematic debate on human security in March 2008, in recognition
of the growing number of States using or referring to the concept." At
this meeting, human security was characterized as a framework to fur-
ther the principles of the U.N. Charter of 1945.45
Human security has further featured in the foreign policies of a
number of governments, most notably those of Canada and Japan. 46 In
1998, Norway and Canada formed a partnership 47 that subsequently
evolved into the Human Security Network mentioned above. As of Sep-
tember 2008, members of the Network included Austria, Canada, Chile,
Costa Rica, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, Norway,
Slovenia, Switzerland, and Thailand (South Africa participates as an ob-
server).48 In addition, Friends of Human Security was established by
Japan as an unofficial, open-ended forum at the United Nations for gov-
ernments to discuss human security from all angles.49 It held its first
meeting in October 2006.50 Among the successes attributed to the human
security agenda by these governments include the creation of the Inter-
43. 2005 World Summit, Sept. 14-16, 2005, 2005 World Summit Outcome, 143, U.N.
Doc. A/60/L. I (Sept. 20, 2005).
44. Srgjian Kerim, President, U.N. General Assembly, Opening Remarks at the The-
matic Debate on Human Security (May 22, 2008), available at http://www.un.org/ga/
president/62/statements/humansecurity220508.shtml (last visited June 18, 2009).
45. Srgjian Kerim, President, U.N. General Assembly, Concluding Remarks at the
Thematic Debate on Human Security (May 22, 2008), available at http://www.un.org/ga/
president/62/statements/crhumansecurity220508.shtm (last visited June 18, 2009).
46. See DEP'T OF FOREIGN AFF. & TRADE, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: CANADA'S FOREIGN
POLICY FOR HUMAN SECURITY (2000), available at http://pubx.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/00-global/
PubsCat2.nsf/56153893FF8DFDA285256BC700653B9F/$file/FreedomfromFear-e.pdf
(last visited June 18, 2009); MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN, THE TRUST FUND FOR
HUMAN SECURITY: FOR THE "HUMAN-CENTERED" 21ST CENTURY (2006), available at
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human-secu/t-fund2 I.pdf (last visited June 18, 2009).
47. Press Release, Dep't of Foreign Aff. & Trade, Canada and Norway Form New Part-
nership on Human Security (May I1, 1998), available at http:/I w0l.intemational.gc.ca
/minpub/Publication.aspx?isRedirect=True&publicationjid=37525 1 &Language=E&docnumber
=117 (last visited June 18, 2009).
48. See VON TIGERSTROM, supra note 30, at 22 (citing Paul M. Evans, Human Security
and East Asia: In the Beginning, 4 J. E. ASIAN STUD. 263 (2004)).
49. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Friends of Human Security,
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human-secu/friends/index.html (last visited June 18, 2009).
50. Id.
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national Criminal Court5' and the agreement of the antipersonnel land
mine ban treaty.
5 2
A large number of academic institutions and centers have been es-
tablished to address human security issues,53 and academic publications
and journals on the subject have proliferated.54
Although the human security framework has gained considerable
momentum and remains firmly on the international security agenda, it
arguably suffered a setback in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the
United States on September 11, 2001. The CHS was established prior to
these attacks, yet operated within a rapidly changing security environ-
ment in which state security, militarization, and unilateralism again rose
to the forefront of national security agendas under U.S. foreign policy, as
evidenced by the U.S.-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and subse-
quent responses adopted in the name of countering terrorism. The CiS
report was issued in the same year that the United States and its allies
went to war in Iraq, without a U.N. mandate. At a minimum, the human
security concept is now a part of the peace and security, as well as the
humanitarian, agendas of the United Nations and is likely to become of
increasing importance. However, at a practical level, the framework has
not displaced traditional notions of security, and the two policy dis-
courses are likely to operate alongside one another.
A number of recent events have provided some impetus toward a
new multi-polar re-configuration of international relations, one in which
the fundamentals of the human security framework may become more
rather than less important. These include the world financial crisis trig-
gered in large measure by U.S. lending practices and with worldwide
51. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90.
52. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of
Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 241.
53. See, e.g., Liu Institute for Global Issues, Human Security Centre,
http://www.ligi.ubc.ca/pagel65.htm (last visited June 18, 2009); Institute for Human Security,
The Fletcher School, Tufts University, http://fletcher.tufts.edu/humansecurity/ (last visited
June 18, 2009); Ford Institute for Human Security, University of Pittsburgh,
http://www.fordinstitute.pitt.edu (last visited June 18, 2009); Centre for Peace and Human
Security, Sciences Po, http://www.peacecenter.sciences-po.fr (last visited June 18, 2009).
54. See, e.g., RMIT Publishing, Journal of Human Security, http://
www.rmitpublishing.com.au/jhs.html (last visited June 18, 2009); CERI Program for
Peace and Human Security, Sciences Po, Human Security Journal/Revue de la srcurit6
humaine, http://www.peacecenter.sciences-po.fr/journal/ (last visited June 18, 2009); The
Fletcher School, Tufts University, The Fletcher Journal of Human Security, http://
fletcher.tufts.edu/praxis (last visited May 27, 2009).
55. See Carla Ferstman, The Human Security Framework and Counter Terrorism: Ex-
amining the Rhetoric Relating to "Extraordinary Renditions", in HUMAN SECURITY AND
NoN-CITIZENS, supra note *, ch. 15.
Spring 20091
Michigan Journal of International Law
reverberations,56 which reminds us of our interdependence in the face of
globalization, as well as the international condemnation of U.S. unilater-
alism in the so-called "war on terror." The latter has been epitomized by
the "kidnap[ping]" and "rendition" of individuals without regard to rules
of international law. The "war on terror" is also epitomized by the Unit-
ed States detention facility at Guantanamo Bay and the resulting legal
vacuum in which many terror suspects have found themselves.5 Argua-
bly of most significance is the election of Barack Obama, a liberal-
minded lawyer/academic whose early policy statements have focused on
reexamining U.S. foreign policy, as President of the United States. His
vision of leadership in this new era begins with the recognition that "the
security and well being of each and every American is tied to the secu-
rity and well-being of those who live beyond [its] borders.' ' He has
indicated that the role of the U.S. is to provide global leadership
"grounded in the understanding that the world shares a common security
and a common humanity."' 9 Although not directly quoting the language
of human security, his early foreign policy statements share many of its
central tenets.
II. SECURITY DISCOURSE AND REFUGEES
Refugees and asylum seekers are never far from international and
domestic security discussions. Whether they are viewed as victims of
security deficits or as potential threats to national or international secu-
rity, security is a defining element in the refugee protection landscape.
There is, therefore, no option but to participate in security debates when
discussing refugee protection.
The international refugee protection regime, founded on the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention)60 and
the humanitarian efforts that followed the mass atrocities of World War
56. One particularly negative aspect of the financial crisis is that States may turn in-
ward, which may constrain the ability of States to implement the vision of human security
beyond their borders in the face of other global crises. See Roger C. Altman, The Great Crash,
2008: A Geopolitical Setback for the West, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2009, at 2, 9.
57. See Ferstman, supra note 55.
58. OBAMA FOR AMERICA, STRENGTHENING OUR COMMON SECURITY BY INVESTING IN
OUR COMMON HUMANITY 1 (2008), available at http://www.cgdev.org/doc/blog/obama-
strengthen-security.pdf (last visited June 18, 2008); see also Barack Obama, Remarks of
Senator Barack Obama: A World that Stands as One (June 18, 2008), available at
http://www.barackobama.comV2008/07/24/remarks-of_senatorbarackobam97.php (last
visited May 27, 2009).
59. See Obama, supra note 58.
60. United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 134, 150 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954) [hereinafter 1951 Convention].
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II, has faced some of its greatest challenges in the post-Cold War envi-
ronment. Throughout the Cold War, security terminology was applied in
favor of refugees. Although the modem refugee protection regime was
built on the compassion evoked by World War II, it was clear by 1950
that refugees had also become important figures in the geopolitical inter-
ests of States and were viewed as being legitimately in flight from
belligerent and politically unfriendly States.6' In addition, as Guy Good-
win-Gill observes, "in drafting the various treaties covering the field,
States have never been blind to the need to protect essential interests...
,62 including security interests.
With the growth in international migration and the shift from inter-
national to internal conflicts in the 1990s, refugees have been viewed as
threats to national borders and security, perceived as criminals and ter-
rorists, and, collectively, as threats to international peace and security.
6 3
Refugees no longer offer the same geopolitical benefits to state interests
as they did in the bipolar politics of the Cold War. The Declaration of
States Parties to the 1951 Convention, issued at the conclusion of the
Global Consultations on International Protection held in the fiftieth an-
niversary year of the 1951 Convention, recognized:
[The] complex features of the evolving environment in which
refugee protection has to be provided, including the nature of
armed conflict, ongoing violations of human rights and interna-
tional humanitarian law, current patterns of displacement, mixed
population flows, the high costs of hosting large numbers of
refugees and asylum-seekers and of maintaining asylum sys-
tems, the growth of associated trafficking and smuggling of
persons, the problems of safeguarding asylum systems against
abuse and of excluding and returning those not entitled to or in
need of international protection, as well as the lack of resolution
of long-standing refugee situations.64
In fact, some refugees arguably fared better under a bipolar nation-
state system, in which they were of use within the superpower rivalry
61. See GIL LOESCHER, BEYOND CHARITY: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND THE
GLOBAL REFUGEE CRISIS 32-55 (1993); LOESCHER, supra note 34.
62. See Guy Goodwin-Gill, Refugees, Rights and Security, in FORCED MIGRATION,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND SECURITY 1, 3 (Jane McAdam ed., 2008).
63. This latter characterization has some beneficial impact in terms of Security Council
action, but has otherwise been a negative portrayal. See infra Part HI.D.
64. Ministerial Meeting of States Parties to the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Proto-
col Relating to the Status of Reguees, Geneva, Switz., Sept. 12-13, 2001, Declaration of
States Parties to the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees, 2, 6, U.N. Doe. HCR/MMSP/2001/09 (Jan. 16, 2002) [hereinafter Declaration of
States Parties].
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that characterized the Cold War. Ironically, the Cold War was responsible
in part for the very refugeehood of these individuals. 6 Of course, this
system did not accommodate all those in need of protection. At that time,
border controls prevented departures where today they prohibit entry.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
noted that, during the 1990s, the problem of forced displacement had
become larger, more complex, and geographically more widespread.
Refugee movements and other forms of population displacement had
also assumed a new degree of political importance, largely because of
their impact on national and regional stability. Noting that "[t]he security
of people and the security of [S]tates are in that sense intimately linked,"
the UNHCR recognized the limitations of its "humanitarian agenda. 67
The nation-state system in this latter context has witnessed the overall
diminution of asylum space due to the erection of toughened border con-
trols and other deterrence measures such as carrier sanctions,
administrative detention and reductions in economic and social rights,
extraterritorial processing and "safe third country" arrangements, restric-
tive definition of the term "refugee," and the establishment of lesser
protection statuses in replacement of asylum.68 It has also been argued
that the notion of borders for the purposes of immigration regulations
has shifted beyond the territory of the nation-state (off-shore) and further
inside it (internal immigration zones), 69 the effect being the creation of
70
rights-free zones.
Refugees and asylum seekers have also figured prominently in secu-
rity debates in the post-September 1 era. For example, there are
references to refugees and asylum seekers in most of the U.N. resolu-
tions on terrorism." Additionally, the perceived link between the
individual refugee and the threat of terrorism has influenced much the
65. See LOESCHER, supra note 61, at 32-55; LOESCHER, supra note 34.
66. U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES [UNHCR], THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFU-
GEES 1997: A HUMANITARIAN AGENDA ch. 1 (1997), available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/publ?id=3f098b4d4.
67. Id.
68. On lesser statuses, see Erik Roxstrbm & Mark Gibney, The Legal and Ethical Obli-
gations of UNHCR: The Case of Temporary Protection in Western Europe, in PROBLEMS OF
PROTECTION: THE UNHCR, REFUGEES, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 37 (Niklaus Steiner et al. eds.,
2003).
69. See Ayelet Shachar, The Shifting Border of Immigration Regulation, 3 STAN. J. C.R.
& C.L. 165 (2007), reprinted in 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 809.
70. See Alice Edwards, Tampering with Refugee Protection: The Case of Australia, 15
INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 192 (2003) (arguing that Australia's attempt to excise territory from the
application of its migration laws is a legal fiction and does not diminish its obligations under
international law).
71. See Goodwin-Gill, supra note 62, at I (tracing the United Nations' approach to
security and its many references to refugees and asylum seekers).
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treatment of refugees by States in the post-September 11 era. As Good-
win-Gill observes:
[T]he already restrictive, hostile and generally repressive meas-
ures which States were already taking towards refugees and
asylum-seekers-such as mandatory detention, denial of sup-
port, denial of access to procedures, to legal advice and
representation and to appeals, and government-to-government
agreements on removals-have been given spurious justification
by the terrorism agenda. For some States (or rather, for some
governments), that has been the opportunity to introduce yet
more stringent laws and policies, often in the aftermath of a ter-
rorist incident, but also generally under a carefully constructed
cloud of fear.
Today, the largest single group of refugees is the Iraqi caseload, hav-
ing fled amidst the unilateral invasion, and subsequent occupation, of
Iraq by the United States and its allies, which was justified in part on
antiterrorism grounds."
According to Fitzpatrick, "[a] crisis exists [today] not because the
[1951] Convention fails to meet the needs of asylum-seekers, but be-
cause it meets them so well as to impose burdens that are no longer
politically tolerable to the States [P]arties involved. 74
I submit that States exploit a combination of gaps and limitations in
the legal protection framework, as well as the changed political land-
scape, to avoid responding to refugee crises. The "exceptionalism" of the
so-called "war on terror" has, for example, seen governments pursue
politically justifiable policies and laws which undermine some funda-
mental human rights guarantees, including through the use of legal
arguments to support their political stance.75 Refugees are relabeled from
being allies in the Cold War to "queue jumpers," "bogus refugees," or
"terrorists."
With the post-Cold War era (and increasingly the post-September 11
era) giving rise to attempts to question the durability of the 1951 Con-
72. Id. at 7.
73. The UNHCR estimates that 4.7 million persons have been displaced as a result of
the Iraq conflict (2.7 million internally, 2 million externally). See UNHCR Iraq,
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/iraq?page=briefing&id=4816ef534 (last visited June 4,
2009).
74. Joan Fitzpatrick, Revitalizing the 1951 Refugee Convention, 9 HARV. HUM. RTS. J.
229, 231 (1996).
75. See, e.g., A and others v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't., [2005] 2 A.C. 68
(H.L.) (the Belmarsh Detainees case) (holding that the indefinite detention of nine foreign
citizens suspected of being involved in terrorist activities was unlawful as both a dispropor-
tionate measure and on the basis of discrimination).
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vention, the human security framework, with its emphasis on the indi-
vidual and away from the "high politics" of the State, may reinvigorate
the waning refugee protection regime. It may at least be a supplementary
defense in its armor. This is explored further below. But, first, what are
its main critiques?
III. CRITIQUING HUMAN SECURITY
Human security is a contested concept. Its main opponents criticize
it for its vagueness; at the same time, it has been praised for its breadth.
The framework has been particularly challenging for some international
lawyers, keen to promote instead a concrete rules-based system and ea-
ger to draw up neat definitions and criteria. Four of the most commonly
mentioned criticisms-lack of a precise definition, lack of a legal
framework, "securitization" problems, and enforceability-are addressed
in this section.
A. Lack of a Precise Definition
The main limiting factor to the usefulness of the concept of human
security is said to be the lack of a precise definition. It has been claimed
that "[h]uman security is like 'sustainable development'-everyone is
for it, but few people have a clear idea of what it means. 76 Gerd Ober-
leitner has identified three "rough categories" from the range of
definitions of human security available:
[A] narrow approach that relies on natural rights and the rule of
law anchored in basic human rights; a humanitarian approach
that understands human security as a tool for deepening and
strengthening efforts to tackle issues such as war crimes or
genocide and finally preparing the ground for humanitarian in-
tervention; and a broad approach that links human security with
the state of the global economy, development, and globaliza-
tion."
At a minimum, human security means security of persons from
threats to life, freedom, and dignity. At its broadest, it includes humani-
tarian imperatives for joint action on a wide range of issues based on
understandings of shared humanity.
76. Roland Paris, Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?, 26 INT'L SEC. 87, 88
(2001).
77. Gerd Oberleitner, Human Security: A Challenge to International Law?, I I GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 185, 187-88 (2005).
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Of the two main state proponents of the human security framework,
Canada and Japan offer different definitions of human security, support-
ing realist claims that national interests are still paramount. Canada, for
instance, has defined human security as "freedom from pervasive threats
to people's rights, safety or lives."78 Canada has limited its dialogue on
human security to the most serious security threats. 79 Canada asserts that
its view of human security is complementary to prevailing efforts that
are focused on national security as well as international efforts to protect
human rights and to promote human development. ° "A human security
perspective asserts that the security of the [S]tate is not an end in itself.
Rather it is a means of ensuring security [and therefore rights] for its
people .... ,
Japan, on the other hand, adopts the broader, all encompassing ap-
proach of the CHS. Japan has stated that the concept of human security
"comprehensively covers all the menaces that threaten human survival,
daily life and dignity-for example, environmental degradation, viola-
tions of human rights, transnational organized crime, illicit drugs,
refugees, poverty, anti-personnel landmines and ... infectious diseases
such as AIDS-and strengthens efforts to confront these threats."82
The mainstay of critiques of the concept revolves around the absence
of a concise definition. These critics argue that the concept is so am-
biguous as to be analytically and practically useless. 8' However, these
same critics concede that "one can support the political goals of human
security ... while recognising that the idea of human security is a mud-
dle."84 Roland Paris, for example, asserts that it may be an effective
campaign slogan, even if it is not so useful as a guide to either research
or policymaking.85 Interestingly, the term "security" itself has been said
78. DEP'T OF FOREIGN AFF. & TRADE, supra note 46, at 3 (emphasis added).
79. Id. (identifying these main threats as including public safety from transnational threats
such as terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime; protection of civilians in armed conflict;
conflict prevention; governance and accountability; and peace support operations).
80. Id.
81. DEP'T OF FOREIGN AFF. & INT'L TRADE, HUMAN SECURITY: SAFETY FOR PEOPLE
IN A CHANGING WORLD 6 (1999) (Can.).
82. MOFA, Diplomatic Bluebook 1999, ch. H, Section 3, http://www.mofa.go.jp/
policy/other/bluebook/1999/ll-3-a.htm (last visited June 18, 2009); see also Yuko Takasu,
Dir.-Gen., MOFA of Japan, Statement at the International Conference on Human Security in a
Globalized World (May 8, 2000), available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/humansecu/
speech0005.html (last visited June 18, 2009).
83. See, e.g., Jane McAdam & Ben Saul, An Insecure Climate for Human Security?
Climate-Induced Displacement and International Law, in HUMAN SECURITY AND NON-
CITIZENS, supra note *, ch. 10; Astri Suhrke, Human Security and the Protection of Refugees,
in REFUGEES AND FORCED DISPLACEMENT: INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, HUMAN VULNERABIL-
ITY, AND THE STATE 93, 101 (Edward Newman & Joanne van Seim eds., 2003).
84. Paris, supra note 76, at 91-92.
85. Id. at 88.
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to be "an elusive term. Like peace, honour, justice, it denotes a quality of
relationship which resists definition. 86
A number of academics have offered definitions of human security.
87
At least one author has suggested that it is a new way to describe the
work of the United Nations.88 Similarly, then-U.N. Secretary-General
Kofi Annan stated that "[e]nsuring human security is, in the broadest
sense, the United Nations' cardinal mission."89 Given the fact that the
traditional security emphasis of the U.N. Charter was seen as the secu-
rity of States, this new shift to human security language must be said to
elevate the human rights aims of the U.N. Charter to a new level.
Moreover, the drafters of the UNDP and CHS reports regard the "all-
encompassing" nature of human security as one of its strengths. Placing
a broad umbrella over issues of human security allows proper considera-
tion of the inter-sectionality of various threats and corresponding
responses. The drafters argue that a broad approach is better suited to
reflecting reality, and that this, in turn, offers space to develop and re-
imagine new solutions. The broad view allows analysis of the inter-
linkages between, for example, environmental degradation and conflict,
between under-development and displacement, or between racism and
terrorism.9° Although undefined, the 1994 UNDP report offers four fun-
damental characteristics of human security:
1. "Human security is a universal concern" 9' relevant to people
in all nations;
2. Human security is transnational in character and interdepend-
ent, that is, threats to human security in one part of the world
affect persons in other parts regardless of state borders;92
3. "Human security is "easier to ensure through early prevention
than later intervention";93 and
4. "Human security is people-centred."94
86. MCSWEENEY, supra note 1, at 13.
87. See Paris, supra note 76, at 91-92.
88. Dwight Newman, A Human Security Council? Applying a "Human Security"
Agenda to Security Council Reform, 31 OTTAWA L. REv. 213 (2000).
89. Kofi Annan, From the Secretary-General: Nothing Lost, Nothing Conceded, Noth-
ing Given Away, 35 U.N. CHRON. ONLINE ED. 3, 3 (1998), available at http://www.un.org/
Pubs/chronicle/1998/issuel/0198p3.html (addressing the Foreign Affairs Committee of the
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference of April 1998).
90. See Oberleitner, supra note 77, at 188.
91. UNDP, supra note 3, at 22.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 23.
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For international lawyers, accustomed to neatly articulating the crite-
ria for particular international crimes or human rights violations, the
broad view may appear intangible and difficult to grasp. But this should
not be seen solely as a problem of the human security framework. It is
also a question of how we "do law" at an international level.
The disciplines of international law and international relations have
long been criticized for being too exclusive, ignoring the rights and in-
terests of women, refugees, and other marginalized groups. 95 Narrow
definitions rarely take account of the full picture of reality or the inter-
ests of all groups.
David Turton has stated that it is important to understand how we
conceive of issues or particular factual scenarios because "we are to
some extent constrained, even imprisoned, by our conceptual maps.
' 96
He argues that "[wie need concepts in order to think about the world, to
make sense of it, to interpret it and to act in relation to it.' 97 Resisting the
need to pin down the notion of human security into narrow legal lan-
guage opens up possibilities for transformative solutions, and for broad
thinking and negotiations not already circumscribed by fixed criteria.
It is worth noting that the concept of human security has faced many
criticisms similar to those leveled against "humanitarianism," a term
widely used in the late 1990s but of narrower ambit. B.S. Chimni, for
example, criticized the language of "humanitarianism" along many of
the same lines as critics of human security:
[T]he word "humanitarian" is omnifarious and lacks rigid con-
ceptual boundaries. It has not been defined in international law
.... It is therefore not captive to any specialized legal vocabu-
lary and tends to transcend the differences between human rights
law, refugee law and humanitarian law. A wide range of acts can
therefore be classified as "humanitarian." Its extendibility facili-
tates ambiguous and manipulative uses and allows the practices
thus classified to escape critique through shifting the ground of
justification from legal rules to the logic of situations.98
The concept of national security is also undefined, or at least it is
subject to varying definitions depending on the interests at issue. It too
95. See, e.g., ENGENDERING HUMAN SECURITY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES (Tranh-Dam
Truong et al. eds., 2006).
96. David Turton, Conceptualising Forced Migration 2 (Refugee Studies Centre, Work-
ing Paper No. 12, 2003).
97. Id.
98. B.S. Chimni, Globalization, Humanitarianism and the Erosion of Refiugee Protec-
tion, 13 J. REFUGEE STUD. 243,244 (2000).
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can be charged with arbitrariness and of being self-serving. The human
security framework does not escape similar and other charges.
From an international law perspective, these outstanding questions
give pause for concern. Without legal rules, the system of international
relations can dissolve into selectivity, unilateralism, and non-legal justi-
fications for acts or omissions. Paradoxically, the international legal
system is similarly selective, multilateral only to the extent that it is in
the national interests of States to act collectively, and permits justifica-
tions for acts or omissions that are ipso facto contrary to human rights
based on unclear criteria, such as public order (ordre public)," national
security, health of others, or even morality. The human rights-human
security debate is dealt with further below. Despite these shared short-
comings, it is possible to characterize human security as the goal and
human rights as a means for its achievement.
B. Lack of a Legal Framework
Similar to lack of a definition, the second main critique of the human
security framework is that the lack of law or its nonbinding nature may
undermine legal guarantees that are already in place, in particular, hu-
man rights norms. This is tied to the vagueness of the concept, which is
said to provide scope to States to avoid any legal imperatives to act. In
1998, UNHCR's Division of International Protection shared some of
these concerns, suggesting for example that references to UNHCR's role
in safeguarding or reinforcing human security represented "a distraction
from and a dilution of UNHCR's statutory function of providing interna-
tional protection to and solutions for refugees" and that the concept
constituted "a misguided attempt to use the language of security in
UNHCR's dialogue with [S]tates, at a time when the organization should
be speaking unequivocally in terms of refugee protection and the defence
of human rights."' °
This concern over legality should be taken seriously. However, it can
be overstated by those who assume that it is the legal character of hu-
man rights that brings about their implementation and ensures the
protection and security of individuals. This is certainly one component
99. For an overview of the difficulties of defining and applying concepts such as "pub-
lic order" under international law, see Alice Edwards, Refugee Status Determination in Africa,
14 AFR. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 204 (2006).
100. Frances Nicholson, Protection and Empowerment: Strategies to Strengthen Refu-
gees' Human Security, in HUMAN SECURITY AND NoN-CITIZENS, supra note *, ch. 3 (citing
UNHCR Memorandum from Soren Jessen-Petersen to Abu Zayd et al.; UNHCR Policy
Committee Meeting on August 3, 1998, Draft Paper by Centre for Documentation and Re-
search, The Concept of Human Security and its Relevance to UNHCR, U.N. Doc. AHC/98/219
(July 28, 1998)).
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of state compliance, not least because the state-based system of interna-
tional law is consent based. It has been argued that States, having already
opted into specific legal regimes and obligations, have therefore more
reason to adhere to their terms. However, many States sidestep even their
existing legal obligations. Many international lawyers are unconcerned
with questions of why States implement their human rights obligations
(rather, they are concerned about whether they have done so or are in
breach of their obligations). This can also mean that they may overlook
or consider irrelevant the view that human rights are politically con-
ceived and endorsed, and their implementation driven by a wide range of
non-law-based influences.
Legal norms developed at the level of international law begin in the
corridors of power and politics before garnering sufficient support to
emerge as law. International law cannot claim to cover the entire range
of human rights and needs or to regulate all issues adequately and in iso-
lation. Even the Declaration of States Parties to the 1951 Convention
acknowledges that this instrument, "as the primary refugee protection
instrument ... , as amended by its 1967 Protocol, sets out rights, includ-
ing human rights, and minimum standards of treatment that apply to
persons falling within its scope."' ' That is, both human rights and refu-
gee law offer minimum, not maximum, standards. These standards are
those that have been achievable at the time of drafting as influenced by,
inter alia, national interests and international relations. Achieving max-
imum human rights protection is as reliant on national interests and
humanitarian goodwill as on legal considerations. International law in
this way is seen as "little more than handmaiden to the powerful. States,
it is argued, employ international law when it suits their interests and
simply disregard it when it does not."'02
But what the above critics ignore is that the human security frame-
work, as elaborated by the United Nations or by state proponents, is not
intended to replace or usurp existing legal frameworks, but rather to sup-
port and to strengthen them. Sadako Ogata and Johan Cels argue that
human security embraces both legal duties and obligations while also
recognizing their ethical and political implications.' 3 Human security in
this sense refers to the rights, "well being, safety, and dignity-of indi-
vidual human beings."'2 4 In this way, the human security framework may
be a useful tool to rethink and reconceptualize security issues as well as
101. Declaration of States Parties, supra note 64, 2 (emphasis added).
102. David Cox & Andrew O'Neill, The Unhappy Marriage Between International Rela-
tions Theory and International Law, 20 GLOBAL CHANGE, PEACE & SEC. 201, 201 (2001).
103. Sadako Ogata & Johan Cels, Human Security-Protecting and Empowering the
People, 9 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 273, 275 (2003).
104. Oberleitner, supra note 77, at 190.
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to deal with those issues that fall outside existing legal parameters, with
a view to moving toward accepted standards and consensus.
It has also been argued that the human security framework draws on
and is linked to the international right to liberty and security of person
contained in a range of international and regional human rights instru-
ments.' °5 However, this right has primarily been used in the narrow
context of arbitrary arrest and detention.' ° That is, it has been posited
that there is an emerging right to human security. 0 7 At a minimum, the
language of rights should be used as the floor but not the ceiling for what
is possible under a re-imagined system of security and international rela-
tions.
C. "Securitization" Problems
The third main criticism of the human security paradigm is that it
can result in putting all issues under a "security" canopy, the aim of
which is to elevate attention to the particular issue. The negative effect of
this "securitization" is that it can label the subjects of security discourse
as threats to security, rather than victims or persons at risk of insecurity.
This is not an uncommon response to refugees and other migrants.
Chimni has argued, for example, that this process of "normalizing" the
language of security has hidden from view the real agendas at play. He
states:
The language of burden sharing has today been transformed into
a language of threats to the security of [S]tates. Refugees are
now seen as threatening a host country's security by increasing
demands on its scarce resources or threatening the security of
regions by their mere presence. The fact that the perceptions can
often be attributed to a policy of containment or to the absence
of burden sharing is veiled by the language of security.'8
The end result, he suggests, is the erosion of fundamental principles,
such as non-refoulement, as States feel justified closing their borders or
105. See, e.g., African Union, African (BANJUL) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
art. 6 , June 27, 1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev.5, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982);
American Convention on Human Rights art. 7, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144
U.N.T.S. 23; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 25, Dec. 16, 1966, S.
EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
106. See SARAH JOSEPH ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITI-
CAL RIGHTS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND COMMENTARY (2d ed. 2004).
107. See Lois E. Fielding, Taking a Closer Look at Threats to Peace: The Power of tile
Security Council to Address Humanitarian Crises, 73 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 551, 568
(1996); Newman, supra note 88, at 213, 215.
108. Chimni, supra note 98, at 252.
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returning individuals to less than ideal circumstances.'O Gregor Noll
makes similar observations in finding that labels do matter and that "se-
curity" is not a neutral label."0 Rather, "security" has predominantly
collective connotations in the discourse of international law,""' "whereby
the collective interest permits the sacrifice of the interests of the individ-
ual.' " 2 "In Noll's view, the individual becomes voiceless in security
discourse." 3 As he observes:
A further characteristic of the security concept is its trump func-
tion: Invoking security concerns seemingly reduces the legal
constraints put on actors and increases the leeway for discretion.
Thus, "securitizing" the discourse on flight and protection
means introducing a bias that ultimately works against the indi-
vidual. 14
Likewise, Astri Suhrke fears "the misappropriation and misuse of the
term to justify [s]tate-centric responses to the movement of people."' 5 In
her examination of its application to refugees, she says:
Applying a "security" perspective to examine the needs of "out-
siders" and their relationship to the community typically
involves assumptions of antagonistic relations and non-tradable
interests. In other words, the negative effects often assumed to
follow the "securitization" of the discourse on refugee move-
ments that was associated with "societal security" in the 1990s
are likely to occur even when the adjective is "human" rather
than "societal."
'
"
6
"All these fear-driven responses play into the racialised and/or xeno-
phobic 'othering' of individuals and populations on the move that is
replete with paternalistic connotation.""7 While these concerns should
not be dismissed, they tend to treat all security discourse as one and the
109. Id.
110. Gregor Noll, Securitizing Sovereignty? States, Refugees and the Regionalization of
International Law, in REFUGEES AND FORCED DISPLACEMENT: INTERNATIONAL SECURITY,
HUMAN VULNERABILITY, AND THE STATE, supra note 83, at 277, 280.
111. Id.
112. Eve Lester, Socio-Economic Rights, Human Security, and Survival Migrants:
Whose Rights? Whose Security?, in HUMAN SECURITY AND NON-CITIZENS, supra note *, ch.
9.
113. Id.
114. Noll, supra note 110, at 280.
115. Lester, supra note 112; see, e.g., Maggie Ibrahim, The Securitization of Migration:
A Racial Discourse, 43 INT'L MIGRATION, 163, 173-78 (2005).
116. Suhrke, supra note 83, at 106-07.
117. Lester, supra note 112 (citing EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM (1979)); Noll, supra
note 110, at 281.
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same. They rest upon an assumption that security is a negative force,
rather than a condition under which human rights can flourish. Although
acknowledging the validity of these arguments, Eve Lester reminds us of
the "risk in failing to engage in either the definitional or operational de-
bate that surrounds the notion of 'human security.""' 8 She urges us to
attempt to explore what possibilities there might be for applying the hu-
man security concept in a manner that yields constructive and protective
outcomes." 9 If the concept of human security can be brought to bear on a
refugee or migration "problem" normatively, she asserts, it may have the
effect of bringing the legal frameworks of international refugee and hu-
man rights law, and indeed humanitarian law where relevant, into
sharper focus. In this way, she argues that "it may serve a constructive
purpose that cannot be achieved by resort to existing legal frameworks
alone."2°
It has also been argued that the consistency between human rights
and human security "provides a potentially valuable language for human
rights advocates to enter into the security sphere and to seek reform of
institutions in that security sphere." 2' That is, in order for human rights
concerns to be more prolific within security discourse, the pathway
might be through the language of human security.22 Shahrbanou Tad-
jbakhsh and Anuradha Chenoy argue that the added value of the concept
lies in the new questions it poses regarding security: "security of
whom?," "security from what?," and "security by what means?"'23 It has
also been suggested that
[s]ecuritization can also be performed with an emancipatory in-
terest. Given the capacity of security language to prioritize
questions and to mobilize people, one may employ it as a tacti-
cal device to give human rights questions a higher visibility, for
example. 24
An alternative put forward by Suhrke, is that the term "vulnerability"
should be applied ahead of "human security."'25 Noll too has noted that
118. Lester, supra note 112.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Newman, supra note 88, at 215.
122. Paris, supra note 76, at 94-95 nn.26, 31 (citing Gary King & Christopher Murray,
Rethinking Human Security, 116 POL. SCI. Q. 585 (2002)); Emma Rothschild, What Is Secu-
rity?, 124 DAEDALUS 53, 58-59 (1995).
123. TADJBAKHSH & CHENOY, supra note 37, at 13.
124. Savitri Taylor, Migration and Human Security in the Asia-Pacific Region, 19 GLOB-
AL CHANGE, PEACE & SEC. 171, 172 (2007) (quoting Jef Huysmans, Defining Social
Constructivism in Security Studies: The Normative Dilemma of Writing Security, 27 ALTER-
NATIVES: GLOBAL, LOCAL, POL. 41, 59 (2002)).
125. Suhrke, supra note 83, at 105.
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"vulnerability" is "not burdened with the military heritage and the col-
lectivist bias of the security concept.'
26
However, the concept of "vulnerability" attracts its own complexi-
ties, "connoting disempowerment and loss of agency."' 27 Frances
Nicholson challenges us to move away from an emphasis on the "vul-
nerability" of refugees to recognition of "refugees as rights-holders and
as agents of their own security and future, an approach very much envis-
aged by the CHS's focus on empowerment.
'28
Ultimately, the language of security-whether "national" or "hu-
man"-is not necessarily antithetical to either the aims and purposes of
the United Nations, or to those of human rights. Although security ter-
minology is open to manipulation by States and can be a central tool in
efforts to undermine or avoid legal obligations, security discourse and
security needs are not new to international or foreign policy agendas, or
to the frameworks of international law. 129 Security concerns are evident
in the language of a number of key provisions on refugee protection. 3°
The human security discourse, with its focus on the individual, re-
quires States to consider the impact of security measures on individuals.
This is not required by the realist approaches to national security, in
which the interests of the State are paramount. Although the protection
of persons qua citizens is not irrelevant to States under the national secu-
rity paradigm, they are not the primary referent objects of security.
Security under the human security concept transcends territorial borders.
Refugees as victims of human insecurity in the form of human rights
violations, persecution, and armed conflict stand to gain under the hu-
man security concept if it is conceptualized and implemented in the
126. Noll, supra note 110, at 282.
127. Lester, supra note 112.
128. Nicholson, supra note 100.
129. See Goodwin-Gill, supra note 62, at 1.
130. The "right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution" in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) "may not be invoked in the case of prosecu-
tions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and
principles of the United Nations." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A,
art. 74, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 183d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter
UDHR]. Similarly, the prohibition on refoulement or return to threats to life of freedom in the
1951 Convention is qualified by Article 33(2), which provides that such protection will not
apply to "a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the secu-
rity of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country." 1951 Con-
vention, supra note 60, art. 33; see also Organization of African Unity [OAU], Convention
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa art. 3, Sept. 10, 1969, 1001
U.N.T.S. 45 [hereinafter OAU Convention] (containing provisions in which the Organization
for African Unity (now African Union) outlawed political and subversive activities by refu-
gees). These provisions were approved in light of concerns by host States of the impact of
these political activities on state security. Id. pmbl. 4-5.
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manner intended. After all, human security is a prerequisite to the en-
joyment of rights. Likewise, the lack of security is the greatest threat to
human rights and the key motivating cause of human displacement and
migration. To adopt an absolutist view that we should not engage in se-
curity discourse is, in my view, to isolate artificially and unhelpfully
international law from the realities of international relations.
D. Enforceability
The fourth critique of relevance to this Essay is that the human secu-
rity framework is weakly institutionalized and has poor enforcement
powers. This may be in part a temporal problem given the fact that the
framework has yet to be taken up fully by the United Nations, or indi-
vidually by a majority of Member States. Paradoxically, the same
charges can be made against human rights law with its system of en-
forcement that revolves around quasi-judicial decisionmaking on
individual petitions and monitoring through State Party reporting, which
have been heavily criticized by many international lawyers.' 3 , However,
the use of the language of security is not just rhetorical. One significant
consequence of identifying a range of threats to human life and dig-
nity-such as environmental disasters, poverty and under-development,
major health risks, and irregular migration-as issues of security is the
implicit potential for activating the enforcement powers of the U.N. Se-
curity Council under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
3 1
In the 1990s, the U.N. Security Council was willing to characterize
some widespread human rights violations and mass human displacement
as threats to international peace and security, thereby putting them with-
in the purview of the United Nations' enforcement powers.'33 The
problem with doing so was the gap that developed between theory and
practice, and the related selectivity of operations. Serious questions also
arose surrounding their effectiveness. According to the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS),
[t]he debate on military intervention for human protection pur-
poses was ignited in the international community essentially
131. The human rights system is, however, being strengthened all the time, through ef-
fort such as through fact-finding and inquiry procedures and regional courts with the power to
issue binding decisions. See, e.g., Alice Edwards, The Optional Protocol to the Convention
Against Torture and the Detention of Refugees, 57 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 789 (2008).
132. See also McAdam & Saul, supra note 83, ch. 10.
133. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1199, at 2-4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/I 199 (Sept. 23, 1998) (calling
for actions to resolve the crisis in Kosovo); S.C. Res. 841, at 2-3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/841 (June
16, 1993) (endorsing an embargo against Haiti in response to the ouster of Jean-Bertrand Ais-
tide); S.C. Res. 688, at 31, U.N. Doc, S/RES/688 (Apr. 5, 1991) (condemning actions taken
against the Iraqi civilian population).
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because of the critical gap between, on the one hand, the needs
and distress being felt, and seen to be felt, in the real world, and
on the other hand the codified instruments and modalities for
managing world order.' 4
The notion of "responsibility to protect" (R2P), which the human se-
curity concept entails or supports (it is not clear which) is a move away
from a right of military intervention on humanitarian grounds to a three-
tiered responsibility framework encompassing a responsibility to pre-
vent, a responsibility to react, and a responsibility to rebuild. The ICISS
identified two basic principles of R2P as follows:
A. State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary re-
sponsibility for the protection of its people lies with the
[S]tate itself.
B. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of
internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the
[S]tate in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it,
the principle of non-intervention yields to the international re-
sponsibility to protect.
35
The ICISS formulated three elements of R2P: prevention, reaction
(which includes military force but is meant to be an "exceptional and
extraordinary measure" 36), and rebuilding. 37 The main emphasis, how-
ever, is on prevention.'38 The R2P doctrine is broader than the concept of
humanitarian intervention, which implies primarily military intervention.
The ICISS limited the exercise of military intervention to cases of "large
scale loss of life, actual or apprehended" or "large scale 'ethnic clean-
sing,' actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced
expulsion, acts of terror or rape."'39 Other qualifying criteria were also
elaborated in some detail.' 4 Military intervention is therefore limited to
only the most severe forms of human insecurity. The World Summit
Outcome document clarified that these severe forms of human insecurity
referred to the four international crimes of genocide, "ethnic cleansing,"
134. INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY (ICISS), THE RESPONSI-
BILITY TO PROTECT % 2.24 (2001), available at http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-
Report.pdf (last visited May 27, 2009).
135. Id. at XI.
136. Id. at XII.
137. Id. at XI.
138. id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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crimes against humanity and war crimes.'4 ' Options under R2P may in-
clude "humanitarian operations, monitoring missions and diplomatic
pressure and ... force [as a last resort].' ' 2 For refugees and asylum
seekers, it has been proposed that R2P could include the responsibility to
grant asylum and to open borders for those fleeing from one or more of
the four crimes listed above.'
4
1
The UNHCR has expressed its acceptance of R2P as one way of al-
leviating some of the root causes of forced displacement, subject to
working out its modalities relating to "eligibility, legitimacy, state sover-
eignty, political will, mandates, and operational effectiveness.'""
However, it is unclear how humanitarian intervention and responsibility
to protect in terms of military intervention will really differ in any actual
situation, given that the players and legal frameworks remain the same.
The politics behind the exercise of enforcement powers under the U.N.
Charter and the veto power of the permanent members of the Security
Council will also remain, even if the human security concept acts to ex-
pand the range of issues that are seen as threats to international peace
and security. The operationalization of human security would appear to
be its greatest challenge.
IV. HUMAN SECURITY AND THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES
So what does or could human security offer refugee protection? This
section adopts a three-tiered approach to this question. First, I briefly
outline the refugee-specific legal regime and identify its gaps, into which
human rights law (and international humanitarian law, as relevant, al-
though the latter is not dealt with in this Essay'4 5) has stepped to
141. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, 138-39, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1
(Oct. 24, 2005).
142. Erika Feller, Dir., Dep't of Int'l Prot., UNHCR, The Responsibility to Protect-
Closing the Gaps in the International Protection Regime and the New EXCOM Conclusion on
Complementary Forms of Protection, Address to "Moving On: Forced Migration and Human
Rights" (Nov. 22, 2005), available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/adminl
opendoc.htm?tbl=ADMIN&id=43a692122 (last visited June 2, 2009).
143. See, e.g., Brian Barbour & Brian Gorlick, Embracing the "Responsibility to Pro-
tect": A Repertoire of Measures Including Asylum for Potential Victims, 20 INT'L J. REFUGEE
L. 533,561 (2008).
144. Erika Feller, Dir., Dep't of Int'l Prot., UNHCR, Migrants and Refugees: The Chal-
lenge of Identity and Integration, Address to the 10th Annual Humanitarian Conference of
Webster University (Feb. 17-18, 2005), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/
42b96a3d2.html (last visited June 4, 2009).
145. For more on the inter-linkages between international humanitarian law and refu-
gees, see Alice Edwards, Crossing Legal Borders: The Interface Between Refugee Law,
Human Rights Law and Humanitarian Law in the "International Protection" of Refugees, in
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: TOWARDS A NEW MERGER
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supplement the rights contained in the 1951 Convention. Second, I con-
sider the role of human rights in the refugee protection regime,
identifying in the process some of its own weaknesses. I conclude that
even with these two legal frameworks operating in favor of the protec-
tion of refugees, many of the problems facing refugees, particularly their
security, remain unaddressed or unresolved. I then turn to ask what the
human security framework could offer this reasonably robust, albeit im-
perfect, legal system.
A. The Refugee Protection Framework
Refugees are the recognized beneficiaries of internationally en-
dorsed rights. Centered on the non-refoulement guarantee in the 1951
Convention, which prohibits States from returning individuals to the
frontiers of territories where they may face threats to their life or free-
dom,'4 6 the international refugee protection regime provides a definition
of who qualifies as a refugee (and therefore who does not) in recognition
of entitlement to special protection, which includes a series of rights re-
levant to the specific situation of refugees. Refugees are a specific
category of non-citizens who are considered deserving of a specific set
of rights, ultimately because they lack the protection of their own gov-
ernments. At the time of this writing, there were 147 States Parties to
either or both the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol. 47 The interna-
tional instruments are reinforced by regional ones, which expand the
category of those entitled to special protection as well as the rights to
which they are entitled in some limited ways.'
48
Institutionally, refugees are served by the UNHCR. 49 Although the
UNHCR is not a substitute for state protection, it is a leading humanitar-
ian organization with a specific mandate to protect and represent the
rights and interests of refugees. It is, therefore, an important player in
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 421 (Roberta Arnold & No~lle Qufnivet eds., 2008); see also 843
INT'L REV. RED CROSS passim (2001) (special edition on the interface between international
humanitarian law and international refugee law).
146. For an overview of the principle of non-refoulement under the 1951 Convention, see
Elihu Lauterpacht & Daniel Bethlehem, The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-
Refoulement, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 87, 98-164 (Erika Feller et
al. eds., 2003).
147. UNHCR, STATES PARTIES TO THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF
REFUGEES AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL 1 (2008), available at http://www.unhcr.org/protect/
PROTECTION/3b73b0d63.pdf (last visited May 28, 2009).
148. For example, the explicit reminder that non-refoulement includes non-rejection at
the frontier and the principle of voluntary repatriation is endorsed as a right in the OAU Con-
vention. See OAU Convention, supra note 130, arts. 2(3), 5.
149. See Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
G.A. Res. 428, at 46, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., 325th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. AIRES/428 (Dec.
14, 1950).
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ensuring the human security of refugees. As of this writing, it operates in
116 countries and has over 6,000 staff.5 Nonetheless, in order to fulfill
its mandate, the UNHCR relies on the assistance and support of States,
including non-States Parties to the 1951 Convention, many of whom are
host to major refugee populations.'5'
Despite enumerating a range of rights for refugees in Articles 3
through 34, the 1951 Convention is not without its gaps. In the post-Cold
War period, in which the nature and scale of displacement has changed,
the 1951 Convention has been criticized as being virtually redundant, or
"functionally inefficient, overly legalistic, complex, and difficult to apply
in a world of competing [and changing] priorities."' 5 2 With such claims,
driven by state interests and serving to undermine the legal and humani-
tarian value of the 1951 Convention, it is at this juncture that human
rights law has stepped in to fill in the "grey areas."' 3
First, the rights enumerated in the 1951 Convention are limited guar-
antees for refugees and asylum seekers and are not the entire range of
rights available to them under international human rights law as a
whole.5 4 For example, there is no entrenched right to family life con-
tained in either the 1951 Convention or the 1950 Statute of the
UNHCR; 55 nor is there a right to liberty and security of person. Al-
though the fundamental principle of refugee law is the protection from
return or refoulement to threats to life or freedom, the guarantee under
the 1951 Convention can be lifted if a refugee poses a threat to national
security or, having been convicted by final judgment of a particularly
serious crime, is considered to be a danger to the community.'56 The non-
refoulement guarantee in the 1951 Convention is not an absolute protec-
tion against refoulement to threats to life or freedom, and thus can play
150. See The UN Refugee Agency, UNHCR, Basic Facts, http://ewww.unhcr.org/
basics.html (last visited June 4, 2009).
151. According to the UNHCR, among the major refugee hosting countries are Pakistan
(2 million), the Syrian Arab Republic (1.5 million), and Jordan (500,300), none of which are
parties to the 1951 Convention. UNHCR, 2007 GLOBAL TRENDS: REFUGEES, ASYLUM-
SEEKERS, RETURNEES, INTERNALLY DISPLACED AND STATELESS PERSONS 8 (2008).
152. Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Asylum 2001-A Convention and a Purpose, 13 INT'L J.
REFUGEE L. 1, 1-2 (2001).
153. See Alice Edwards, Human Rights, Refugees and the Right to "Enjoy" Asylum, 17
INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 293, 295 (2005).
154. Id. at 303.
155. However, the Final Act of the 1951 U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons also recommended that governments "take the nec-
essary measures for the protection of the refugee's family." See id. at 309. For an overview of
protections of family life under international human rights law versus international refugee
law, see id. at 308-19.
156. 1951 Convention, supra note 60, art. 33(2).
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into the national security agendas of States. 5 7 Likewise, protection
against expulsion can be lifted on grounds of national security or public
order, subject to a number of legal safeguards.'58
Second, the rights listed in the 1951 Convention are subject to, in the
words of James Hathaway, a complex "structure of entitlement" that
provides for "enhanced rights as the bond strengthens between a particu-
lar refugee and the State Party in which he or she is present.' 59 That is,
not all rights contained in the 1951 Convention apply to recognized ref-
ugees immediately upon recognition, and only a few overtly apply to
asylum seekers.' 6° In contrast, international human fights law is in prin-
ciple applicable to all persons on the basis of their shared humanity (with
161limited exceptions ) and must be applied according to principles of
non-discrimination. In this way, human fights is not based on national-
ity or territory, but on jurisdiction. In contrast, Article 3 of the 1951
Convention provides that States Parties must apply the Convention pro-
157. Notably, restrictive applications of the refugee definition is a more effective means
of excluding an individual from refugee protection than recourse to the non-refoulement guar-
antee, which has arguably attained the status of customary international law.
158. 1951 Convention, supra note 60, art. 32.
159. JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 154
(2005); see also Guy S. GOODWIN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 305-07 (3d ed. 2008) (distinguishing four general categories on which the extent of a
refugee's rights may depend, namely "simple presence," "lawful presence,' "lawful resi-
dence," and "habitual residence").
160. These include non-discrimination, non-penalization for illegal entry or stay in cases
of threat to life or freedom, and non-refoulement. See 1951 Convention, supra note 60, arts. 3,
31, 33.
161. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 105, art. 25 (applying the right to participate in public
affairs only to citizens); id. art. 13 (applying the protection against arbitrary expulsion only to
aliens); see also International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 2(3),
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 23 [hereinafter ICESCRI (allowing for discretion by developing
countries in guaranteeing economic rights to non-nationals).
162. See Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 15 on "The Position of Aliens Under
the Covenant", U.N. Doc. HRI/GENJI/Rev.I (Apr. 11, 1986), [hereinafter Gen. Comment No.
15] ("Thus the general rule is that each one of the rights of the [ICCPR and the ICESCR] must
be guaranteed without discrimination between citizens and aliens."); see also Loizidou v.
Turkey, App. No. 15318/8923, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 513, 52 (Dec. 18, 1996) ("The obligation
to secure ... the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention, derives from the fact of con-
trol [of territory.]"); Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General
Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/
Rev.l/Add. 13 (Mar. 29, 2004) [hereinafter Gen. Comment No. 31]; Comm. on the Elimination
of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation XI on Non-Citizens, U.N. Doc. A/46/18
(Mar. 19, 1993) [hereinafter Gen. Recommendation No. XI]. In relation to expanded under-
standings of state responsibility in recent case law, see Guy Goodwin-Gill, Keynote Address,
Extra-Territorial Processing of Asylum Claims from a General International Law Perspective,
Refugee Studies Centre International Conference on Refugees and International Law: Chal-
lenges to Protection, University of Oxford (Dec. 15-16, 2006).
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visions without discrimination only as to "race, religion or country of
,,161
origin.
The third advantage of having recourse to human rights law is that
should a State fail to respect its human rights obligations, appropriate
redress mechanisms may be available.' " Apart from writing a letter of
complaint to the UNHCR or exercising rights under domestic law, no
such mechanisms exist under the 1951 Convention.
Fourth, international human rights law "is especially relevant with
respect to non-State parties to the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol
that are otherwise parties to various human rights instruments, as well as
its role in developing international customary rules that apply to all
States.' 65 Of all of the rights contained in the 1951 Convention, only the
race component of the prohibition on discrimination and the principle of
non-refoulement have attained the status of customary international
law. 166
Fifth, "[t]he discrepancies between [the treatment of] refugees rec-
ognized under the 1951 Convention and the wider group of persons in
need of international protection"'' 67 reinforce the relevance and impor-
tance of human rights instruments.' 68 Many victims of human insecurity,
for instance, would fall within this latter category but may not qualify as
refugees. 1
69
Finally, international human rights law applies to individuals within
the jurisdiction of the State,' 70 and it can, therefore, apply on both sides
of the border. The operation of international refugee law, on the other
hand, usually starts with the act of seeking admission to the territory of
163. 1951 Convention, supra note 60, art. 3.
164. Individual petition mechanisms are available under several international treaties.
See e.g., Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-
tion Against Women arts. 1-2, G.A. Res. 54/4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/4 (Oct. 15, 1999);
Convention Against Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art.
22, G.A. Res. 39/45, U.N. GAOR 39th Sess., 93d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/45/Annex
(Dec. 10, 1984); Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (entered into force
March 23, 1976). For further discussion, see infra Part III.B.2.
165. Edwards, supra note 153, at 299.
166. See Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opin-
ion OC-18, 2003 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 18/03, 100-01 (Sept. 17, 2003) (on
discrimination asjus cogens); Declaration of States Parties, supra note 64, pmbl. 4.
167. See UNHCR, Exec. Comm. High Comm'r Programme, Note on International Pro-
tection, 21, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/830 (Sept. 7, 1994).
168. Oldrich Andrysek, Gaps in International Protection and the Potential for Redress
Through Individual Complaints Procedures, 9 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 392, 393-94 (1997).
169. See Andrew Shacknove, Who Is a Refugee?, 95 ETHics 274, 278 (1985) (question-
ing whether there is any real reason to treat individuals displaced by persecution differently
from those displaced by economic causes or other calamities).
170. This, of course, depends on whether the State has ratified or acceded to the relevant
human rights treaty and/or whether the right has attained the status of custom.
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an asylum State, but more usually after crossing an international border.
An important exception to this rule is the prohibition on refoulement,
which is accepted as applying "at the frontier" or arguably whenever
"effective control" is exercised.' Without international human rights
law, many individuals would remain in a legal vacuum until they man-
aged to escape the persecutory conduct and reach safety in another
country.
International human rights law is, therefore, another legal system
available to strengthen and enhance existing protection standards for
refugees.' 72 Neither body of law renders the other redundant or secon-
dary, but it is clear that in some instances human rights law is needed to
fill some gaps in the 1951 Convention. It is not, though, the panacea to
all the problems in the refugee protection framework, suffering from
many of its own weaknesses. In addition, law alone is unable to resolve
distinct and evolving refugee crises that demand immediate political at-
tention (especially in an international system in which politics run
alongside rights). Law, as far as it applies, can and should guide the re-
sponses taken by the international community to such crises, but
ultimately many other non-legal factors and non-legal solutions are in-
volved. Erika Feller, then-Director of UNHCR's Department of
International Protection (and now Assistant High Commissioner for Pro-
tection), has characterized the interlinkages pragmatically: "To put it
simplistically, to see the refugee problem as an issue of human rights law
creates protection space."' 73 Could further space be created if refugee
protection is also seen as an issue of human security?
According to Joan Fitzpatrick the main weaknesses in the refugee
protection framework can be categorized as follows:
(1) the vagueness and manipulability of one of its key provisions,
the refugee definition;
(2) the lack of an agreed framework for refugee determination
and the risks involved in harmonization efforts that attempt to
fill this vacuum [as now being played out in the context of the
European Union' 4];
171. See Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 146, at 87 (referring to EXCOM Conclu-
sions that support this position).
172. Edwards, supra note 153, at 296, 298-99.
173. Feller, supra note 142.
174. See European Commission, The European Union Policy Towards a Common Euro-
pean Asylum System, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice-home/fsj/asylumfsj-asylum_
introen.htm (last visited June 18, 2009); see also Council Directive 2004/83/EC, Minimum
Standards for the Qualification and Status of Third Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as
Refugees or as Persons who Otherwise Need International Protection and the Content of the
Protection Granted, 2004 O.J. (L 304) 12-23 (establishing uniform standards for the European
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(3) crucial substantive lacunae or ambiguities, particularly the
right to receive asylum, the fight of admission, the rights of
asylum-seekers interdicted at sea, and the right of temporary
refuge for forced migrants who do not qualify as Convention
refugees; and
(4) key gaps in inter-state obligations, especially burden sharing
through admission of refugees, security issues relating to ref-
ugee encampments and dependable financing of refugee
prevention and relief strategies.71
To her listing, one ought also to add strategies for dealing with mass
influxes of refugees, the question of how to protect refugees and asylum-
seekers within mixed migration flows, and the issue of protracted refu-
gee situations and the quest for durable solutions. 76 Solutions to these
issues are not found within the terms of the 1951 Convention, although
its principles, such as non-discrimination, non-refoulement, and non-
penalization, should guide the approach taken.' 77 In addition, questions
continue to be posed about how to strengthen the supervisory mandate of
the UNHCR, which highlights the problem of the enforceability of refu-
gee fights.
Community Member States, with the exception of the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Den-
mark); UNHCR, Annotated Comments on the EC Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April
2004, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=4200d8354 (last visited
June 18, 2009).
175. Fitzpatrick, supra note 74, at 232.
176. Each of these issues was discussed during the Global Consultations on International
Protection and readdressed by the Convention Plus Initiative and the High Commissioner's
Dialogues on Protection in 2007 and 2008. See, e.g., UNHCR, Mechanisms of International
Cooperation to Share Responsibilities and Burdens in Mass Influx Situations, U.N. Doc.
EC/GC/01/7 (Feb. 19, 2007), available at http://unhcr.org/3ae68f3cc.html (last visited June
18, 2009); UNHCR, Complementary Forms of Protection, U.N. Doc. EC/GC/0 1/18 (Sept. 4,
200 1), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3bfa84345.html (last visited June 18,
2009); UNHCR, Asylum Processes: Fair and Efficient Asylum Procedures, U.N. Doc.
EC/GC/01/12 (May 31, 2001), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/
3b36f2fca.html (last visited June 18, 2009); UNHCR, Practical Aspects of Physical and Legal
Protection with Regard to Registration, U.N. Doc. EC/GC/01/6* (Feb. 19, 2001), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3bfa82464.htm (last visited June 18, 2009); UNHCR,
The Civilian Character of Asylum: Separating Armed Elements from Refugees, U.N. Doc.
EC/GC/01/5 (Feb. 19, 2001), available at http://unhcr.org/3ae68f3cl8.html (last visited June
18, 2009).
177. See 1951 Convention, supra note 60; Volker Turk, New Issues in Refugee Research:
UNHCR's Supervisory Responsibility I (UNHCR, Dep't of Int'l Prot., Working Paper No. 67,
2002), available at http://www.unhcr.org/research/RESEARCH/3dae74b74.pdf (last visited
June 18, 2009).
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B. The Complementary Human Rights System
As noted above, international human rights law has increasingly be-
come an important supplement to refugee protection. For example, it has
been used to expand the definition of a refugee in the 1951 Conven-
tion,18 to complement rights available, and to provide the basis for
complementary or subsidiary forms of protection for individuals who
need protection and who would not otherwise meet the persecutory or
other components of the refugee definition." 9 This is because, under in-
ternational human rights law, States are in principle obligated to afford
rights to all persons, citizens, and non-citizens alike, who are under their
jurisdiction-territorially or otherwise)'°
Nonetheless, this general position is subject to a number of legal ex-
ceptions, especially in relation to political and economic rights.'
During the drafting negotiations of the two main human rights trea-
ties-the ICCPR and the International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)' 2-the divisive politics of the Cold War
were evident. The human rights regime that resulted has arguably been
weakened by these political influences. The division of rights into three
so-called "generations"'83 reminds us of the East-West politics that influ-
enced the elaboration of the two main separate treaties making up the so-
called International Bill of Rights. Under this division, civil and political
rights (first generation rights) are seen to have greater value than eco-
nomic, social, and cultural rights (second generation rights), as well as
other purported rights revolving around group rights, such as those to
development, peace, or water (third generation rights). Despite state-
178. See, e.g., Alice Edwards, Age and Gender Dimensions in International Refugee
Law, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 146, at 46-48 (discussing
how human rights standards relevant to women have been transposed to ensure that the ex-
periences of refugee women are given full consideration during refugee status determination).
179. See, e.g., JANE MCADAM, COMPLEMENTARY PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2007).
180. See supra note 178. On the question of the extraterritorial application of human
rights norms, see generally Michael Gondek, Extraterritorial Application of the European
Convention on Human Rights: Territorial Focus in the Age of Globalization?, 52 NETHS.
INT'L L. REV. 349 (2005).
181. See e.g., ICCPR, supra note 105, art. 25 (extending only to citizens the right to
participate in public affairs); see also Edwards, supra note 153, at 320-28 (discussing the fact
that refugees are often not given an equal right to work as citizens).
182. ICCPR, supra note 105; ICESCR, supra note 161.
183. The "generations" metaphor is problematic for a number of reasons, not least of
which is that it can work to overstate some of the differences between different types of rights.
It is used here simply as an organizing tool. On the "generations" metaphor, see Karel Vasak,
Pour une troisi~me giniration des droits de lhomme, in STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS PRINCIPLES IN HONOUR OF JEAN PICTET (C.
Swinarski ed., 1984); Karel Vasak, Les diffdrentes catdgories des droits de l'homme, in I LES
DIMENSIONS UNIVERSELLES DES DROITS DE L'HOMME (A. Lapeyre et al. eds., 1991).
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ments to the contrary by the United Nations that human rights are uni-
versal, indivisible, and non-hierarchical,'M the legal reality does not
always match the political rhetoric.' 8
Rights have been ranked in importance, evidenced by the idea of de-
rogability of some rights in times of public emergency,86 the failure to
recognize the justiciability of specific types of rights,'8 7 ideas of immedi-
ate versus progressive implementation, ' and the qualified or limited
nature of many fundamental freedoms.'89 States have often employed
some of these legal ambiguities to limit the enjoyment of rights to non-
nationals.' 90
However, such limitations should not be read as suggesting that the
human rights system is worthless, or that States are free to disregard
their human rights obligations without consequences. There are many
184. See, e.g., World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna, Austria,
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, '1 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 25, 1993)
("All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The interna-
tional community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same
footing, and with the same emphasis.").
185. See Theodor C. van Boven, Distinguishing Criteria of Human Rights, in THE IN-
TERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Karel Vasak & Philip Alston eds., 1982)
(discussing the distinction between fundamental human rights and other human rights).
186. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 105, art. 4. Very few rights are of a non-derogable and
absolute nature, and even these have been subject to challenges by States Parties. See Saadi v.
Italy, App. No. 37201/06, 102-14 (Feb. 28, 2008), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/
tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search "Saadi v. Italy" in "Case Title") (last visited June 2,
2009) (challenging the idea of an absolute prohibition on deportation where the deportee faces
risk of torture); Ramzy v. The Netherlands, App. No. 25424/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R.) (pending before
the Grand Chamber). The right to be protected from arbitrary detention and the right to secu-
rity and liberty of person are not part of the privileged group of absolute rights. See ICCPR,
supra note 105, arts. 4, 9.
187. For example, the initial failure to agree to an Optional Protocol to the ICESCR was
based on the belief that economic, social, and cultural rights are nonjusticiable. The draft
Optional Protocol to the ICESCR includes an individual communications procedure and was
adopted by the General Assembly on Dec. 10, 2008. G.A. Res. 63/117, art. 2, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/63/117 (Dec. 10, 2008).
188. Early views of States Parties and the treaty bodies are that ICCPR rights are "im-
mediately enforceable" and that ICESCR rights are "to be realized progressively." It is now
clear that some rights of the ICESCR are "immediately enforceable," such as nondiscrimina-
tion. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], General Comment No. 16: The Equal Right
of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of all Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Art. 3 of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), T 16, U.N. Doc.
E/C. 12/2005/4 (Aug. 11, 2005).
189. The latter is "particularly true for the so-called fundamental freedoms, that is, the
freedoms of religion or belief, expression and speech, and association and assembly, as well as
the freedom of movement." Nigel S. Rodley, International Human Rights Law and Machinery
for Monitoring its Implementation in Situations of Acute Crisis, in CONFERENCE ON THE PRO-
MOTION AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ACUTE CRISIS 51, 52 (Dep't for Int'l Dev. &
Human Rights Centre, Univ. of Essex eds., 1998).
190. See DANIEL MOECKLI, HUMAN RIGHTS AND NON-DISCRIMINATION IN THE "WAR
ON TERROR" (2008).
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legal checks on the actions of governments in their attempts to restrict
human rights. Suspension of rights in a state of emergency, for example,
must threaten the life of the nation, be officially proclaimed, and the
measures taken must be strictly required by the exigencies of the situa-
tion and must not be inconsistent with the State's other obligations under
international law.' 9' Appealing to national security arguments to limit
fundamental freedoms is judged according to legal criteria of strict legal-
ity, necessity, reasonableness, and proportionality. 2  Moreover,
reservations made by a State must be compatible with the object and
purpose of the treaty,'93 and international obligations must be interpreted
and applied in good faith.' 94
A further consequence of a human rights system built on dialogue,
consensus, and compromise is that it is often selectively and inconsis-
tently applied. States opt in to the various human rights treaties, and the
associated litigation processes may also require further consent by States
Parties in order to be bound. Apart from the International Court of Jus-
tice and some regional human rights courts, very few mechanisms have
the capacity to issue binding judgments. Many States Parties to various
treaties have also not incorporated the terms into their domestic laws,
making access to justice for human rights ineffective at the local level.
Thus, in international relations terms, international human rights law,
like all international law, is reliant on the convergence or "coincidence of
interests,''095 or some other political impetus to act.
In the context of averting or resolving a refugee crisis, the legal
framework can be used to persuade governments to stop human rights
violations, to agree to or to implement a cease-fire arrangement, or to
allow safe passage for humanitarian organizations or refugees. However,
many other considerations are also at play, including what would be at
stake if a State failed to comply. These considerations may include trade
relations, foreign aid, or membership in a regional or international com-
munity of likeminded States (that is, reputational considerations). With
the proliferation of international courts and tribunals, the possibility of
prosecution can act as a deterrent to governments and other violators of
191. See Rodley, supra note 189, at 53.
192. See Marc-Andr6 Eissen, The Principle of Proportionality in the Case-Law of the
European Convention of Human Rights, in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS, 125, 125-37 (R. St. J. MacDonald, F Matscher & H. Petzond eds., 1993).
193. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 19(c), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 [hereinafter VCLT].
194. Id. arts. 26, 31.
195. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 10, at 111 (2005) (attributing compliance with
international law prohibitions on genocide and crimes against humanity as a "coincidence of
interests").
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human rights; not least because "unlawful deportation or transfer" is a
recognized war crime. '9
Refugees are typically, but not always, the products of collapsed,
weak, or unstable States, in which internal strife and human rights
abuses are evident. As noted by the UNHCR in 1997, "[r]efugee move-
ments and other forms of forced displacement provide a useful (if
imprecise) barometer of human security and insecurity."' 97 In many situa-
tions, refugees originate not only from unstable States but also unstable
regions. "[F]orced displacement of people is a clear indication that the
web of rights and obligations which links the citizen to the [S]tate has
broken down."'98 "By and large neither the law of human rights nor the
notion of human rights is well adapted to dealing with the anarchy atten-
dant on the generally collapsed [S]tate."' 9  In fact, international human
rights law "presupposes the existence of a relatively stable govern-
ment."296 Respect for human rights in many regions in which refugees
find themselves is characterized more by breach than by adherence. Host
States, too, suffer from many of the same or similar shortcomings as
those States from which the refugees fled, causing difficulties with im-
plementing refugee protection standards there.'
Realist language of the sanctity of borders and sovereignty is widely
used by States to prevent international action and serves to reinforce the
ineffectiveness of international human rights law without an intervention
capacity. Security Council interventions for threats or violations of hu-
man rights remain a controversial issue and have been constrained to the
202
most egregious of cases. Furthermore, judicial systems tend to operate
as an ex post facto exercise in seeking reparations or redress for harms
done, and this limits their capacity to prevent refugee crises occurring in
the first place, or to prevent their escalation.20 That is, human rights legal
196. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(a)(vii), July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
197. UNHCR, supra note 66.
198. Id.
199. Rodley, supra note 189, at 51.
200. Id.
201. See UNCHR, Exec. Comm. of the High Comm'r Programme, Note on International
Protection, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/1039 (June 29, 2007); UNHCR, THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S
REFUGEES 2006: HUMAN DISPLACEMENT IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM (2006), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/static/pub/sowr2006/toceng.htm (last visited June 18, 2009).
202. See supra Part III.
203. There are some preventive mechanisms, such as the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination (CERD), which has developed an ad hoc early warning or
urgent procedure in order to prevent the escalation of situations into conflict or to prevent
resumption of hostilities. CERD, Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Dis-
crimination, S9 15-19, Annex Ill, U.N. Doe. A/48/18 (Sept. 15, 1993).
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mechanisms are generally reactive in nature, whereas their use as a tool
to reinforce political pressure on States can be preventive.'2
In practice, refugees rarely enjoy the same full entitlements to hu-
man rights that citizens do, whether in Europe, the Americas, Asia, or
Africa. The experience of refugees, and asylum seekers is frequently
characterized by discrimination, xenophobia, criminalization, poverty,
humanitarian fatigue, lack of empowerment, dependency, and uncer-
tainty. Often fuelled by governments for political purposes, anti-refugee
sentiment-an increasing phenomenon worldwide-provides domestic
public support for the failure of governments to implement rights for this
group of "outsiders." In international relations terms, it may not be in a
State's interests to ensure rights-protection, and in some cases, it may be
in their interests to violate international treaties for political gain. 25 Apart
from enjoying lesser rights, asylum seekers, refugees, and other non-
citizens have frequently been the targets of national security initiatives.
In the so called "war on terror," non-citizens, including refugees and asy-
lum seekers, have been on the frontline of media and policy attacks,
being viewed with suspicion as threats to national security.
206
C. Why Talk Human Security?
Why talk human security when refugees are the subject and benefi-
ciaries of a wide-ranging, albeit imperfect, legal protection system?
The above section has detailed a specifically tailored protection sys-
tem for refugees, one which is increasingly supplemented by
international human rights law in order to keep it relevant to today's dis-
placement challenges. Despite the legal gaps in this protection system,
including particularly its enforcement weaknesses, it nonetheless pro-
vides, at a minimum, benchmark standards against which the actions of
States can be judged and to which refugees and their advocates can ap-
peal. There is no doubt that refugees, compared with other non-nationals
and migrants, are in a privileged legal position.0 7 Yet, the deprivations of
refugee rights is an ongoing concern, if not an increasing one, in part
204. Some regional legal systems do work effectively to prevent governments from re-
turning non-citizens to their countries of origin if they face a serious threat of torture or other
cruel or inhuman treatment, including where they are suspected of engagement in terrorist
activities. See generally Chahal v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 413 (1997); Soering v.
United Kingdom, II Eur. H.R. Rep. 439 (1989) (relating to non-refoulement to torture).
205. For example, the 2001 Australian federal election was widely recognized as having
been won by using the "trump card" of anti-refugee sentiment.
206. See, e.g., Ferstman, supra note 55, ch. 15; Craig Forcese, A Distinction with a Legal
Difference: The Consequence of Non-Citizenship in the "War on Terror", in HUMAN SECU-
RITY AND NON-CITIZENS, supra note *, ch. 12; Daniel Moeckli, Immigration Enforcement
After 9/11 and Human Rights, in HUMAN SECURITY AND NON-CITIZENS, supra note *, ch. 13.
207. Shacknove, supra note 169, at 276.
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because of the limited reach of human rights and refugee law and in part
because of wider political factors. Reconciling the rights of refugees and
asylum seekers with the interests of States in managing migration, for
example, has required the UNHCR to engage in policy discussions on
migration management, an area of state interest that largely falls outside
existing protection frameworks. °8 So, what could human security add to
this mix?
1. People-Centered
The people-centered focus of human security, irrespective of one's
attachment or allegiance to the State, is conceptually powerful for refu-
gees and other non-citizens. By definition, non-citizens are generally
outside the remit of a State's national interests. Under the border- and
sovereignty-oriented national security paradigm, the non-citizen is usu-
ally the first to be excluded, neglected, or treated with suspicion as
threats to the security of the State emerge. They are rarely able to exer-
cise a political voice or to have access to litigation procedures to secure
their rights. Human rights as a basis for activation of the United Nations'
enforcement powers have also proven inadequate. Moreover, and per-
haps most tellingly, there remain gaps in the international legal
framework for the protection of refugees.
The people-centered approach shares its focus with development
discourse, which has adopted a people-centered or human-development
agenda,20 and the "people-oriented planning" policies of the UNHCR in
relation to refugee and humanitarian protection.2 ° Like human rights, it
prioritizes dialogue around people and their rights and their needs. While
notions of territory, borders, and citizenship have not disappeared from
this discourse, they are downplayed in favor of a human-centric view of
security.
Feminist scholars have long questioned the focus of international re-
lations on state security. They claim that this approach is problematic on
a number of levels. First, the idea "that [Sitates represent a unified com-
munity '' 21 is questionable. This is especially problematic for women, but
also for other marginalized groups such as refugees, who have generally
been excluded from full citizenship within borders. Second, it assumes
208. See UNHCR, NOTE ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION (2008).
209. UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1993, at 2 (1993) (listing human security
as one of "five pillars of people-centred world order").
210. See, e.g., MARY B. ANDERSON ET AL., A FRAMEWORK FOR PEOPLE-ORIENTED
PLANNING IN REFUGEE SITUATIONS TAKING ACCOUNT OF WOMEN, MEN AND CHILDREN: A
PRACTICAL PLANNING TOOL FOR REFUGEE WORKERS 13 (1992).
211. Anne Orford, The Politics of Collective Security, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 373, 395
(1996).
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that protecting state security results in more secure conditions for citi-
zens, and this fails to take account of the many people living in
conditions of insecurity within sovereign State's borders.21'2 For example,
the actual numbers of individuals internally displaced by reason of con-
flict was estimated to be 26 million at the end of 2007, and far exceeded
those seeking international protection as refugees (16 million). 3 Al-
though the State remains one of the main instruments of security,
individuals instead of borders become the objects of that security.! '1
Although most threats to human security can be formulated as hu-
man rights violations, the added value of the language of security is that
it "can be used in social [and political] contexts where the language of
human rights would meet entrenched opposition.,2 5 That is, the language
of human security can be useful in situations in which human rights lan-
guage fails; additionally, the "humanization" of security discourse can
provide entry points for human rights advocates to enter the debate. 2'6 As
Bertrand Ramcharan has noted, "international human rights norms are
crucial to the definition of human security and ... human rights strate-
,,217gies are essential for its realization. Conversely, strategies to bring
about secure conditions within countries of origin and asylum are also
essential for the realization of human rights. It is a symbiotic, rather than
an antagonistic, relationship.
Concerns that States may manipulate or appropriate the language of
security for their own political purposes, which could lead to the further
"securitization" of refugee issues, should not be blamed on the concept
of human security itself. Rather, it reflects the realpolitik of its applica-
tion.
2. Multilateralism, International Cooperation, and Interdependence
The human security framework further embraces multilateralism, in-
ternational cooperation, and interdependence, recognizing rightly that
threats to human security in one part of the world affect persons in other
parts and that this needs to be taken into account in designing solutions
212. See id. at 396.
213. UNHCR, supra note 151, at 2. These sixteen million are made up of 11.4 million
refugees of concern to UNHCR and 4.6 million Palestinian refugees under the mandate of
U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Id. Sta-
tistics for 2008 were not available as this Essay went to press.
214. Ken Booth, Security and Emancipation, 17 REV. INT'L STUD. 313, 318 (1991).
215. Sabina Alkire, A Conceptual Framework for Human Security 39 (Ctr. Research on
Inequality, Hum. Sec. & Ethnicity, Working Paper No. 2, 2003), available at http://
www.crise.ox.ac.uk/pubs/workingpaper2.pdf (last visited June 18, 2009); see also VON TIGER-
STROM, supra note 30, at 40.
216. Alkire, supra note 215, at 39.
217. BERTRAND G. RAMCHARAN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN SECURITY 231 (2002).
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and responses.28 That is, one of its strengths is its recognition of the
transboundary or transnational nature of today's threats to human secu-
rity. Today's internally displaced persons can quickly become
tomorrow's refugees if the factors causing their human insecurity are not
resolved. Today's refugees living in protracted camps may become to-
morrow's irregular migrants, or they may be recruited by non-state
armed groups or the state military and paramilitary groups and prolong
armed conflict. As noted above, refugees are a litmus test for the state of
human security worldwide. Causes of displacement are no longer limited
to persecution or international conflicts, but include, inter alia, human
rights violations, civil conflicts, environmental degradation, international
terrorism, poverty, and underdevelopment. Situations of displacement, in
turn, can foster other issues of insecurity-for national borders as well as
individuals-including drug and people trafficking and smuggling, and
irregular migration.2 9 The human security framework acknowledges
these interlinkages and thereby expands the ways in which displacement
can be addressed.22°
3. Prevention
As already noted, the system of international legal protection is gen-
erally reactive in nature rather than preventive. The human security
framework, in contrast, is oriented toward early action and response. It
acknowledges that the failure to deal with the human security issues of
individuals and refugees can have an impact on national, regional, or
global security, and hence should be framed as a universal concern re-
quiring early intervention.
Alongside the human security framework is the emerging doctrine of
R2P, which has as its central tenet that the primary responsibility to pro-
tect one's citizens lies with the State but if the State is unable or
unwilling to do so, the responsibility must be borne by the broader
community of States. National borders are increasingly irrelevant in the
face of transnational threats. Theoretically, R2P offers some potential for
enforcement action in the face of serious threats to human insecurity. As
Ant6nio Guterres, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, stated in his
address to the U.N. Security Council in January 2009,
218. CHS, supra note 7, at 12.
219. Id.
220. It is also noted that the UNHCR has been increasingly linking issues of displace-
ment with development. See UNHCR, CORE GROUP ON DURABLE SOLUTIONS, FRAMEWORK
FOR DURABLE SOLUTIONS FOR REFUGEES AND PERSONS OF CONCERN 3-6 (2003), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/partners/PARTNERS/3f1408764.pdf (last visited May 28, 2009).
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[e]ffective prevention [of displacement] will require a carefully
balanced, coordinated and targeted combination of measures in
the political, diplomatic, developmental, environmental and hu-
manitarian domains. Effective prevention will require action to
be taken by a wide range of different stakeholders, including
[S]tates, [U.N.] entities, regional bodies, international financial
organisations and non-state actors. And in our increasingly inter-
connected and interdependent world, effective prevention will
require new networks and coalitions to be formed, linking those
who are working to promote Human Security at the level of the
local community to those who are striving to attain the same ob-
jective on a national, regional and global basis.22
4. Empowerment and Protection
Finally, with its dual strategies of protection and empowerment, the
concept of human security aims to foster long-term solutions to refugee
problems. The UNHCR and States have long implemented protection
strategies, viewing refugees as at-risk individuals or victims in need of
immediate sanctuary and protection. However, the dignity of refugees
also requires that they are respected as human beings capable of becom-
ing active and contributing members of the communities in which they
live, rather than "passive recipients of aid.'2 22 Not only is this a concep-
tual shift from viewing refugees as protection seekers and, therefore,
often as burdens on the host State, but equally as persons capable of con-
tributing positively to their host communities. Protection and
empowerment are dual strategies that operationalize the concept of hu-
man security; the benefits of empowerment for refugees in this sense
cannot be overstated.
CONCLUSION: MOVING TOWARD A LEGAL DISCOURSE ON
HUMAN SECURITY?
It has been submitted that "international human rights norms define
the meaning of human security.' '223 Human rights, as a concept and as a
legal regime, is oriented toward securing freedom, dignity, justice, equal-
ity, and protection for all, irrespective of citizenship or nationality. It is
asserted that there is, therefore, convergence, rather than divergence, be-
221. U.N. SCOR, 64th Sess., 6062d plen. mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6062 (Jan. 8, 2009)
(emphasis added).
222. UNHCR, REINTEGRATION AND LOCAL SETTLEMENT Div., SELF-RELIANCE HAND-
BOOK iv (2005); see also Nicholson, supra note 100.
223. RAMCHARAN, supra note 217, at 9.
Spring 20091
Michigan Journal of International Law
tween human rights and human security. Human security can only be
realized by a robust system of human rights; and similarly, human rights
are meaningless without a secure environment in which to enjoy them.
The same applies in relation to refugee protection. The human security
framework already shares many of the central tenets of human rights and
refugee protection: It is people-centered and supports principles of inter-
dependence, multilateralism, universalism, burden and responsibility
sharing, and early prevention. However, law alone, without political will,
cannot solve the many and expanding causes and incidences of human
displacement that exist in the world today. Human security offers space
to rethink and to reconceptualize security and protection challenges; and
may plug some of the protection gaps in international law on an ad hoc
or temporary basis. Goodwin-Gill has described the challenge as fol-
lows:
The art is to translate the rhetoric of human rights protection in
times of emergency into a working reality that is commensurate
with human dignity, compatible with international obligations
and consistent with the rule of law.224
Human security, as a fluid and broad ranging concept compatible
with human rights and supplementary to international law, may be one
means through which the rights, dignity, and security of refugees can be
furthered. Human security speaks to state interests, while reinforcing
human rights objectives. Law is the safety net for refugees, which needs
to be strengthened by, in particular, improved access to judicial redress
mechanisms. However, law is only one instrument in the toolbox of in-
ternational relations. Human security, in contrast, offers added benefits
in terms of its flexibility, conceptual appeal, and location in the political
corridors of the mainstream United Nations.
Moreover, it is no longer possible for international lawyers to sit on
the sidelines of security debates that touch on and impact refugee protec-
tion:
Without international law, international relations theory and
practice would amount to little more than a constant reaffirma-
tion that right is right. Without international relations, we would
not be able to expose instances when international law is an in-
strument of might or to advocate what needs to be done to
reaffirm the principle right not might. Without international rela-
tions, our ability to succeed strategically in developing new
224. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 62, at 7.
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international law, founded on "the principle of right not might,"
would be considerably limited.22
It is possible that a legal right to human security may eventually
emerge that is carefully drafted and which satisfies some of the concerns
of many international lawyers. However, anyone attempting to articulate
such a right would need to be aware that legalizing the concept of human
security and its associated policy agenda may diminish its value and
power that it enjoys as a non-legal tool of international relations.
225. Clarence J. Dias, International Relations and International Law: From Competition
to Complementarity, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: BRIDGING
THEORY AND PRACTICE (Thomas Biersteker et al. eds., 2007); Cox & O'Neill, supra note 102,
at 203.
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